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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and it may be made before or after the execution of the will.31 It
must, however, be made by the testator.3 2
The court's stress on intent rather than form is the most rea-
sonable construction in view of the phraseology and purpose of the
statute. It accomplishes the desired result-repairing the effects of
an oversight, avoiding regulation of testamentary provisions, and
giving effect to parental intentions. A set form for the settlement
would not only tend to control a parent's testamentary distribution
of his property but also have a greater likelihood of frustrating the
execution of his real intentions.
X
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ExcLUSIvE STATUTORY REMEDY
-RcOvERY FOR PARTIAL SILICOTIC DISABILITY DENIED.-Plaintiffs,
partially disabled by silicosis, sued defendant in negligence, charging
violation of the New York Labor Law.' The Court of Appeals
affirmed dismissal of the complaints and held that the plaintiffs were
barred from maintaining the actions by the provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Law covering total silicotic disability,2 and that
such exclusive remedy 3 was not unconstitutional. Cifolo v. General
Electric Co., 305 N. Y. 209, 112 N. E. 2d 197 (1953).
The usual workmen's compensation act has as its objective the
protection of the employee against accidents 4 and illnesses arising
80 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
31 See Matter of Stone, 200 Misc. 639, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 775 (Surr. Ct.
1951) ; Matter of Kraston, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
32 Matter of Bostwick, 78 Misc. 695, 140 N. Y. Supp. 588 (Surr. Ct. 1912).
'N. Y. LABOR LAW § 200 ("General duty to protect health and safety
of employees") ; § 299 (ventilation and removal of dust in factories where dust
producing machines are in use).
2N. Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW §3(2). "Occupational diseases. Com-
pensation shall be payable for disabilities sustained or death incurred by an
employee resulting from the following occupational diseases:
"28. Silicosis or other dust diseases resulting in total disability or death."
3 Id. § 11. "The liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place
of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representa-
tives, husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on account of such injury
or death. .. ."
SSee Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N. Y 313 317, 12 N. E. 2d
311, 312 (1938) ; Choctaw County v. Bateman, 252 P. 2d 465, 467 (Okla. 1952).
"To constitute an accident within the Workmen's Compensation Act there must
be an untoward, unforeseen or unexpected event or series of events causing
injury." Matter of Carrie, 254 P. 2d 410, 411 (Idaho 1952).
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from the nature of his occupation. 5 The theory underlying the law
is that of strict liability of the employer toward his employees, re-
gardless of negligence on the part of either.6 If the employer has
complied with the law and is insured,7 the employee's exclusive rem-
edy is under the statute.8 If, however, the employer has not met the
insurance requirements, the employee may elect either to sue in a
common-law action for negligence,9 or to prosecute an action under
the Workmen's Compensation Law for statutory damages.' 0 Of
course, if the disability is not one covered by the statute, the common-
law remedy remains.
New York enacted its first Workmen's Compensation Act in
1910,11 and the Court of Appeals shortly thereafter declared it un-
constitutional. 12 This decision led to the amendment in 1913 of the
New York State Constitution,' 3 and in the same year, a new com-
pensation act was passed,' 4 the validity of which was upheld by the
5 See Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139, 143, 194 N. E. 61, 63
(1934).6 N. Y. WoRxMaN's COMP. LAW § 10. This differs from the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, which provides compensation for an employee injured
through the negligence of the employer, while engaged in interstate commerce.
35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1946). However, the federal
act is an exclusive remedy, and the absence of negligence on the part of the
employer in such a case does not permit the employee to invoke a state statute.
New York Central R. R. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 (1917), reversing 216
N. Y. 284, 110 N. E. 614 (1915); cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Strickland,
87 Ga. App. 596, 74 S. E. 2d 897, 910 (1953). However, where both parties
have waived their rights under the federal act, and have voluntarily submitted
their cause to a state compensation board, such board's decision is binding.
So. Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern, 73 Sup. Ct. 340 (1953).
7N. Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW § 50.81d. § 11. See PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORK PRACTICE
114 n. 2 (4th ed. 1953).
9 ". . . [I]n such an action it shall not be necessary to plead or prove
freedom from contributory negligence nor may the defendant plead as a de-
fense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant nor that
the employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that the injury was
due to the contributory negligence of the employee." N. Y. WORKMEN'S
COmP. LAW § 11. See Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Robards, 161 F. 2d 929 (4th
Cir. 1947).
10 N. Y. WoRxME'S CoMP. LAW § 11. An action for the statutory amount
is usually resorted to when there is no negligence on the part of the employer.
11 Laws of N. Y. 1910, c. 674. ("AN ACT to amend the labor law, in
relation to workmen's compensation in certain dangerous employments."). For
an excellent treatment of the development and administration of workmen's
compensation laws throughout the United States, see Dovm, ADMINISTRATION
OF WoRKM's COMPENSATION (1936).
'
2 Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911). "It is con-
ceded that this is a liability unknown to the common law and we think it plainly
constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property under the Federal and State
Constitutions... ." Id. at 294, 94 N. E. at 439. See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 37 (1952).
13 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 19 (1894) (as amended in 1913, and renumbered
§ 18 by the Constitution of 1938).
14 Laws of N. Y. 1913, c. 816. In 1914, the statute was "re-enacted because
1953]
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United States Supreme Court.15
Until 1935, the coverage of the act was limited to certain spe-
cified diseases, and did not include silicosis. 16 The employee, there-
fore, still had his common-law remedy-a suit for negligence arising
from violation of the Labor Law.17 In a leading case, Barrencotto
v. Cocker Saw Co.,'8 the Workmen's Compensation Board dismissed
the complaint on the ground that silicosis was not one of the diseases
compensable under the act and that the plaintiff therefore had no
cause of action. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that "[b]y
no construction . . . can these words [exclusive remedy] be found
to mean that the right to compensation in case of certain injuries
should be exclusive and in place of liability for other injuries." 19
This case remains the law in New York.
2 0
In 1935, however, the statute was amended to cover both par-
tial and total disability arising from silicosis. 2 1  When the list of
compensable diseases was thus extended, the common-law remedy
was taken from the employee, and he was relegated to the statutory
compensation provided by the act.
22
The present uncertainty arose in 1936, when the legislature ex-
pressly excluded partially-disabling silicosis from the list of com-
pensable diseases 28 which by then had grown to include "any and all
of doubt having arisen as to its constitutionality, the amendment to the con-
stitution authorizing its enactment not having become part of the constitution
until January 1, 1914." Laws of N. Y. 1914, c. 41. This was declared con-
stitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Jensen v. Southern
Pacific Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600 (1915), rev'd on other grounds, 244
U. S. 205 (1917). "It is plainly justified by the amendment to our own State
Constitution and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
215 N. Y. at 528, 109 N. E. at 604.
15 New York Cent. R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917). "... [Iun our
opinion, laws regulating the responsibility of employers for the injury or death
of employees arising out of the employment bear so close a relation to the
protection of the lives and safety of those concerned that they properly may be
regarded as coming within the category of police regulations." Id. at 207.
See DODD, ADMINIsTRAION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 33 (1936).
16 Laws of N. Y. 1928, c. 754; see Powers v. Porcelain Insulator Corp.,
285 N. Y. 54, 57, 32 N. E. 2d 790, 791 (1941) ; Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp.,
276 N. Y. 313, 317, 12 N. E. 2d 311, 312 (1938).
17 See Powers v. Porcelain Insulator Corp., srpra note 16.
18 266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934).
19 Id. at 145, 194 N. E. at 64,
20 See Cifolo v. General Elec. Co., 305 N. Y. 209, 220, 112 N. E. 2d 197,
202 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
21 Laws of N. Y. 1935, c. 254; see Mapes v. Massey-Harris Co., 19 F.
Supp. 667 (W. D. N. Y. 1937).22 See Cope v. General Elec. Co., 101 N. Y. S. 2d 46, 47 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
279 App. Div. 886, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 16 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd sub twin. Cifolo
v. General Elec. Co., supra note 20.
23 Laws of N. Y. 1936, c. 887; see Mapes v. Massey-Harris Co., supra
note 21; Powers v. Porcelain Insulator Corp., 285 N. Y. 54, 58, 32 N. E. 2d
790, 792 (1941).
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occupational diseases." 24 Immediately thereafter, attempts were
made to circumvent the statute on the theory that since the disease
was no longer compensable under the act, the common-law rules were
restored, and the Barreneotto 25 case again became applicable; and
if this were not so, then the statute was unconstitutional. 26  These
claims were met by the argument that since the legislature had ex-
pressly excluded the remedy for partial silicotic disability, it must
have been their intention to deprive the employee of all compensation
for such disability, rather than restore the common-law remedy 2 7
It was further pointed out that even if the amendment were uncon-
stitutional, the employee would be thrown back upon the 1935 statute,
covering both forms of disability, and the common-law remedy would
still be unavailable.28
With the law in this state of confusion, the Court of Appeals
in the instant case decided for the first time on the merits,2 9 that the
employee's common-law remedy had in fact been abolished by the
1936 amendment excluding partial disability cases from coverage, and
further that "... . the Legislature acted within its powers in producing
that result." 3 0 The effect has been to deprive the workingman of
any compensation at all for an illness resulting from the inherent
nature of his occupation-one for which he formerly had a remedy
either in negligence or under the compensation act; and this despite
the fact that defendant may have violated a statutory duty imposed
by the Labor Law, which is, in itself, negligence per se.3 '
24 N. Y. WoRKmF's Coie. LAW § 3(2), col. 1, 28; see Goldberg v. 954
Marcy Corp., 276 N. Y. 313, 317, 12 N. E. 2d 311, 312 (1938); see DODD,
ADmINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIO 41 (1936).
25266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934).
26 See, e.g., Scherini v. Titanium Alloy Co., 286 N. Y. 531, 37 N. E. 2d
237 (1941); delBusto v. E. I. Dupont deNemours & Co., 167 Misc. 920, 5
N. Y. S. 2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd 2ner., 259 App. Div. 1070, 21 N. Y. S.
2d 417 (4th Dep't 1940).
27 See Cifolo v. General Elec. Co., 305 N. Y. 209, 213, 112 N. E. 2d 197,
198 (1953).28 See Scherini v. Titanium Alloy Co., supra note 26 at 535, 37 N. E. 2d
at 238. By Laws of N. Y. 1940, c. 548, a statute of limitations was imposed on
prior claims. In 1947, the Workmen's Compensation Law was again amended,
and Article 4-A was repealed. Totally-disabling silicosis is now included in
section 3, subd. 2, 128. Laws of N. Y. 1947, c. 431. The substance of the
law was not changed, however, with respect to partial and total disability.
29 See Cifolo v. General Elec. Co., 279 App. Div. 884, 885, 110 N. Y. S. 2d
759, 760 (1st Dep't 1952) (dissenting opinion) ; see, e.g., Scherini v. Titanium
Alloy Co., supra note 26; Powers v. Porcelain Insulator Corp., 285 N. Y.
54, 32 N. E. 2d 790 (1941).
30 Cifolo v. General Elec. Co., supra note 27 at 214, 112 N. E. 2d at 199.
31 Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 200 N. E. 824
(1936). "The duty imposed by statute is absolute and proof of disregard of
a duty created by statute for the protection of a special class establishes ...
negligence as a matter of law." Id. at 304, 200 N. E. at 829; cf. Bellows v.
Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 257 App. Div. 15, 17, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 655, 657
(4th Dep't 1939), aff'd mee., 283 N. Y. 581, 27 N. E. 2d 440 (1940); Anderson
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This result would seem inconsistent with the objective of the
statute-to compensate for injuries and diseases arising from the
nature of the occupation, rather than to deprive the employee of an
existing remedy without substituting another in its place.8 2 The
argument that coverage for total disability is an adequate substitute 33
is fallacious. Rather, the fact that the statute is in derogation of
the common law and therefore subject to strict construction 3 4 should
be controlling. The decision in the instant case seems to indicate,
however, that only the legislature can remedy the present situation,
either by restoring partially-disabling silicosis within the coverage of
the statute, or by an express declaration that the common-law rem-
edies, which formerly adhered to a violation of the Labor Law in
such a case, be restored.
v. Milliken Bros., 123 App. Div. 614, 617, 108 N. Y. Supp. 61, 63 (2d Dep't
1908), aff'd mere., 194 N. Y. 521, 87 N. E. 1114 (1909).
32 See Cifolo v. General Elec. Co., supra note 29.
33 See delBusto v. E. I. Dupont deNemours & Co., 167 Misc. 920, 924, 5 N. Y.
S. 2d 174, 177 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd mren., 259 App.. Div. 1070, 21 N. Y. S.
2d 417 (4th Dep't 1940). "While it is true the legislature would have been
powerless to take away the common law right of remedy and provide no relief,
here it not only substituted relief as provided by the Workmen's Compensation
Law, but a reasonable period of limitation was fixed in which to bring the
common law action." Ligiecki v. E. I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 46 F. Supp.
266, 269 (W. D. N. Y. 1942).
34 See BLAcK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONsTRucTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAWS 237 (1896). "Statutes in modification or derogation of the common
law will not be presumed to alter it further than is expressly declared, or fur-
ther than may be fairly and reasonably inferred from the purpose and nature
of the statute or from the language employed in it. Such acts will be liberally
construed if their nature is remedial, but their operation will not be extended
by a forced construction." Id. at 242. ". . . [I] f the statute is to be considered
ambiguous it should be construed most favorably to the claimant." Brown v.
Adlers Monument & Granite Works, 274 App. Div. 861, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 85
(3d Dep't 1948).
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